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Abstract. Finding a stable matching is one of the central problems in algorithmic game theory. If
participants are allowed to have ties and incomplete preferences, computing a stable matching of max-
imum cardinality is known to be NP-hard. In this paper we present a (3L− 2)/(2L− 1)-approximation
algorithm for the stable matching problem with ties of size at most L and incomplete lists. Our result
matches the known lower bound on the integrality gap for the associated LP formulation.
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1 Introduction
In an instance of the classical stable matching problem we are given a (complete) bipartite graph G =
(A ∪B,E) where, following standard terminology, the nodes in A will be referred to as men, and the nodes
in B represent women. Each man a ∈ A possesses a (strict, and complete) preference order over women in
B, and similarly, all women in B have a preference order over men in A. A matching M in G is called stable
if there are no blocking pairs (a, b); i.e. there do not exist (a, b) 6∈ M where both a and b prefer each other
over their current partners in M (if there are any). In their celebrated work [4], Gale and Shapley proposed
an efficient algorithm for finding a stable matching, providing a constructive proof that stable matchings
always exist.
Stable matchings have wide-spread applications (e.g., see Manlove [3]), and many of these are large-scale.
Therefore, as McDermid [15] points out, assuming that preferences are complete and strict is not realistic.
Thus, in this paper, we will focus on stable matchings in the setting where preference lists are allowed to be
incomplete and contain ties. Here, a woman is allowed to be indifferent between various men, and similarly,
a man may be indifferent between several women. In this setting we consider the maximum-cardinality stable
matching problem where the goal is to find a stable matching of maximum cardinality.
It is well-known that, in the settings whereG is either complete or preferences do not contain ties, all stable
matchings have the same cardinality [5]. Moreover, a straightforward extension of the algorithm in [4] solves
our problem in these cases. When ties and incomplete preferences are permitted simultaneously, on the other
hand, the problem of finding a maximum-cardinality stable matching is well-known to be NP-hard [14].
Furthermore, Yanagisawa [18] showed that it is NP-hard to find a (33/29 − ε)-approximate, maximum-
cardinality stable matching. The same author also showed that assuming the unique games conjecture (UGC)
it is hard to achieve performance guarantee of 4/3− ε.
On the positive side, maximum-cardinality stable matchings with ties and incomplete preferences have
attracted significant attention [1,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,16,17]. The best-known approximation algorithms for the
problem achieve an approximation ratio of 3/2 [9,16,17].
How does the hardness of maximum-cardinality stable matching depend on the maximum allowed size of
ties in the given instance? Huang and Kavitha [6] recently considered the case where the size of any tie is
bounded by L = 2. The authors proposed an algorithm and showed that its performance guarantee is at most
10/7. Chiang and Pashkovich [2] later provided an improved analysis for the same algorithm, showing that
its real performance ratio is at most 4/3, and this result is tight under the UGC [18]. Lam and Plaxton [13]
very recently designed a 1 + (1 − 1/L)L-approximation algorithm for the so-called one-sided special case of
our problem, where only preferences of men are allowed to have ties.
1.1 Our Contribution
Our main result is captured in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Given an instance of the maximum-cardinality stable matching problem with incomplete prefer-
ences, and ties of size at most L; the polynomial-time algorithm described in Section 2 finds a stable matching
M with
|M | ≥
2L− 1
3L− 2
|OPT|,
where OPT is an optimal stable matching.
Our algorithm is an extension of that by Huang and Kavitha [6] for ties of size two: every man has L
proposals where each proposal goes to the acceptable women. Women can accept or reject these proposals
under the condition that no woman holds more than L proposals at any point during the algorithm. Similar
to the algorithm in [6], we use the concept of promotion introduced by Kira´ly [9] to grant men repeat chances
in proposing to women. In comparison to [6], the larger number of proposals in our algorithm leads to subtle
changes to the forward and rejection mechanisms of women, and to further modifications to the way we
obtain the output matching.
Our analysis is inspired by the analyses of both, Chiang and Pashkovich [2], and Huang and Kavitha [6],
but requires several new ideas to extend it to the setting with larger ties. In both [6] and [2], the analyses
are based on charging schemes : some objects are first assigned some values, called charges, and then charges
are redistributed to nodes by a cost function. After a charging scheme is determined, relations between the
generated total charges, and the sizes of output and optimal matchings are established, respectively, that
lead to an approximation ratio. The analysis in [6] employs a complex charging scheme that acts globally,
possibly distributing charges over the entire graph. In contrast, the charging scheme in [2] is local in nature,
and exploits only the local structure of the output and optimal matchings, respectively.
We do not know of a direct way to extend the local cost-based analysis of [2] to obtain an approximation
algorithm whose performance beats the best known 3/2-approximation for the general case. Indeed we believe
that any such improvement must involve a non-trivial change in the charging scheme employed. As a result, we
propose a new analysis that combines local and global aspects from [2,6]. The central technical novelty in the
analysis is captured by Lemma 4 that provides an improved lower bound on the cost of components whereas
Corollary 2 bounds the cost from below by a simple multiple of the number of edges that are contained both
in an optimal matching and in the components. As we will see later, our new charging scheme allows for a
more fine-grained accounting of augmenting paths for the output matching of our algorithm.
2 Algorithm for Two-Sided Ties of Size up to L
We introduce some notational conventions. Let a′, a′′ ∈ A be on the preference list of b ∈ B. We write
a′ ≃b a
′′ if b is indifferent between a′ and a′′, and we write a′ >b a
′′, or a′ ≥b a
′′ if b strongly, or weakly
prefers a′ over a′′, respectively. The preferences of men over women are defined analogously. For c ∈ A ∪B,
we let N(c) denote the set of nodes adjacent to c in G.
2.1 How men propose
Each man a ∈ A has L proposals p1a, p
2
a, . . . , p
L
a . A man starts out as basic, and later becomes 1-promoted
before he is eventually elevated to 2-promoted status. Each man a ∈ A has a rejection history R(a) which
records the women, who rejected a proposal from a during his current promotion status. Initially, we let
R(a) = ∅, for all a ∈ A.
Each proposal pia for a ∈ A and i = 1, 2, . . . , L goes to a woman in N(a) \R(a) most preferred by a, and
ties are broken arbitrarily. If a proposal pia for a ∈ A and i = 1, 2, . . . , L is rejected by a woman b ∈ B, b
is added to the rejection history of a, and subsequently, pia is sent to a most preferred remaining woman in
N(a) \R(a).
Suppose now that R(a) becomes equal to N(a) for some man a ∈ A. If a is either basic or 1-promoted
then a’s rejection history is cleared, and a is promoted. Otherwise, if a is already 2-promoted, a stops making
proposals.
2.2 How women decide
Each woman b ∈ B can hold up to L proposals, and among these more than one can come from the same man.
Whenever she holds less than L proposals, newly received proposals are automatically accepted. Otherwise,
b first tries to bounce one of her proposals, and if that fails, she will try to forward one of her proposals. If
b can neither bounce nor forward a proposal, then b rejects a proposal.
We continue describing the details. In the following, we let P (b) and A(b) denote the set of proposals
held by b ∈ B at the current point, and the set of men corresponding to these, respectively. Suppose that
|P (b)| = L, and that b receives a new proposal pia for some a ∈ A and i = 1, . . . , L.
Bounce step. If there is a man α ∈ A(b) ∪ {a} and a woman β ∈ B \ {b} such that β ≃α b, and β
currently holds less than L proposals, then we move one of α’s proposals from b to β, and we call the bounce
step successful.
Forward step. If there is a man α ∈ A(b) ∪ {a} and a woman β ∈ B \ {b} such that β ≃α b, at least
two proposals from α are present in P (b), no proposal from α is present in P (β) and β is not in R(α), then
b forwards a proposal pjα ∈ P (b) ∪ {p
i
a} for some j = 1, . . . , L to β and the forward step is called successful.
As a consequence of a successful forward step, α makes the proposal pjα to β.
We point out that bounce and forward steps do not lead to an update to the rejection history of an
involved man. To describe the rejection step, we introduce the following notions. For a woman b ∈ B, a
proposal pi
′
a′ is called more desirable than p
i′′
a′′ for a
′, a′′ ∈ A and i′, i′′ = 1, . . . , L if b strongly prefers a′ to a′′,
or if b is indifferent between a′ and a′′ and a′ has higher promotion status than a′′. A proposal pi
′
a′ ∈ P (b)
is least desirable in P (b) if pi
′
a′ is not more desirable than any proposal in P (b). Whenever b ∈ B receives a
proposal pia, |P (b)| = L, and neither bounce nor forward steps are successful, we execute a rejection step.
Rejection step. If there is unique least desirable proposal in P (b) ∪ {pia}, then b rejects that proposal.
Otherwise, if there are more than one least desirable proposal in P (b), b rejects a proposal from a man with
the largest number of least desirable proposals in P (b) ∪ {pia}. If there are several such men, then we break
ties arbitrarily. Consequently, b is added to the rejection history of the man whose proposal is rejected.
2.3 The algorithm
An approximate maximum-cardinality stable matching for a given instance G = (A ∪B,E) is computed in
two stages.
Stage 1. Men propose in an arbitrary order and women bounce, forward or reject proposals as described
above. The first stage finishes, when for each man a ∈ A, one of the following conditions is satisfied: all
proposals of a are accepted; and R(a) becomes equal to N(a) for the third time.
We represent the outcome of the first stage as a bipartite graph G′ = (A∪B,E′) with the node set A∪B
and the edge set E′, where each edge (a, b) ∈ E′ denotes a proposal from a held by b at the end of the first
stage. Note that G′ may be a multigraph in which an edge of the form (a, b) appears with multiplicity equal
to the number of proposals that b holds from a. Clearly, each node u in G′ has degree at most L, denoted by
degG′(u) ≤ L, since every man has at most L proposals that may be accepted and every woman can hold at
most L proposals at any point in the first stage.
Stage 2. We compute a maximum-cardinality matching M in G′ such that all nodes of degree L in G′
are matched. The existence of such matching is guaranteed by Lemma 1. The result of the second stage is
such a matching M , that is the output of the algorithm.
Lemma 1. There exists a matching in the graph G′ such that all nodes of degree L in G′ are matched.
Moreover, there is such a matching M , where all nodes of degree L in G′ are matched and we have
|M | ≥ |E′|/L .
Algorithm 1 Stage 1 of the algorithm
1: let G = (A ∪B,E) be an instance graph, and N(c) denote the set of nodes adjacent to c ∈ A ∪B in G
2: let G′ = (A ∪B,E′) be a multigraph with E′ initialized to the empty multiset of edges
3: let degG′(u) denote the degree of node u in G
′, and A(b) denote the set of nodes adjacent to b ∈ B in G′
4: for all a ∈ A do
5: R(a) := ∅ ⊲ R(a) is the rejection history of man a
6: stata := 0 ⊲ stata is the promotion status of man a
7: end for
8: while ∃a ∈ A s.t. degG′(a) < L and R(a) 6= N(a) do
9: let b ∈ N(a) \ R(a) be a woman s.t. b ≥a b
′ for all b′ ∈ N(a) \ R(a)
10: propose(a, b)
11: end while
12: return E′
{The following subroutine describes how b accepts the proposal from a, or bounces, forwards, or rejects a proposal}
13: procedure propose(a, b)
14: if degG′(b) < L then
15: E′ := E′ ∪ {(a, b)}
16: else if ∃α ∈ A(b) ∪ {a} and ∃β ∈ N(α) s.t. β ≃α b and degG′ β < L then
17: E′ := E′ ∪ {(a, b), (α, β)} \ {(α, b)} ⊲ bounce
18: else if ∃α ∈ A(b)∪ {a} and ∃β ∈ N(α) \R(α) s.t. β ≃α b, |(E
′ ∪ {(a, b)}) ∩ {(α, b)}| ≥ 2 and α /∈ A(β) then
19: E′ := E′ ∪ {(a, b)} \ {(α, b)}
20: propose(α, β) ⊲ forward
21: else
22: let A denote {α ∈ A(b) ∪ {a} : for all a′ ∈ A(b) ∪ {a}, α ≤b a
′ and if α ≃b a
′, then statα ≤ stata′}
23: let α0 be a man in argmaxα∈A |(E
′ ∪ {(a, b)}) ∩ {(α, b)}|
24: E′ := E′ ∪ {(a, b)} \ {(α0, b)} ⊲ reject
25: R(α0) := R(α0) ∪ {b}
26: if R(α0) = N(α0) then
27: if statα0 < 2 then
28: statα0 := statα0 + 1
29: R(α0) := ∅
30: end if
31: end if
32: end if
33: end procedure
Proof. Consider the graph G′ = (A ∪B,E′) and the following linear program
max
∑
e∈E′
xe
s.t.
∑
e∈δ(u)
xe ≤ 1 (u ∈ A ∪B)
∑
e∈δ(u)
xe = 1 (u ∈ A ∪B, degG′(u) = L)
x ≥ 0.
It is well-known that the feasible region of the above LP is an integral polyhedron. Moreover, the above LP
is feasible as is easily seen by considering the point that assigns 1/L to each edge in E′. Hence there exists
an integral point optimal for this linear program. Notice, that every integral point feasible for this linear
program is a characteristic vector of a matching in G′, which matches all nodes of degree L in G′. To finish
the proof, notice that the value of the objective function calculated at x⋆ equals |E′|/L. Thus the value of
this linear program is at least |E′|/L, finishing the proof. ⊓⊔
2.4 Stability of output matching
Let the above algorithm terminate with a matching M . We first argue that it is stable.
Lemma 2. The output matching M is stable in G = (A ∪B,E).
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction thatM is not stable, i.e. suppose that there exists an edge (a, b) ∈ E that
blocks M . If b rejected a proposal from a during the algorithm, then b holds L proposals when the algorithm
terminates and all these proposals are from men, who are weakly preferred by b over a. Thus the degree of
b in G′ is L implying that b is matched in M with a man, who is not less preferred by b than a. We get a
contradiction to the statement that (a, b) blocks M .
Conversely, if b did not reject any proposal from a during the algorithm, then the algorithm terminates
with all L proposals of a being accepted, particularly, by women, who are weakly preferred by a over b.
Therefore the degree of a in G′ is L implying that a is matched in M with a woman, who is not less preferred
by a than b. Again, we get a contradiction to the statement that (a, b) is a blocking pair for M . ⊓⊔
2.5 Running time
In this section, our goal is to show that the running time of the algorithm is polynomial in the size of
the graph G = (A ∪ B,E). We achieve our goal by demonstrating that each stage of the algorithm has a
polynomial execution time. For the first stage, we illustrate that only a polynomial number of proposals are
bounced, forwarded, or rejected during this stage. For the second stage, the proof of Lemma 2 implies that
it is sufficient to find an optimal extreme solution for a linear program of polynomial size.
First, we show that proposals are bounced only polynomially many times. For every b ∈ B, at most L
proposals may be bounced to b. Indeed, with each proposal bounced to b, the number of proposals held by b
increases; also, the number of proposals held by b never decreases or exceeds L during the algorithm. Hence
at most L|B| proposals are bounced during the first stage.
Second, we illustrate that proposals are forwarded only polynomially many times. For every a ∈ A,
promotion status of a, and b ∈ B such that (a, b) ∈ E, at most one proposal of a may be forwarded to b. To
see this, let b′ be a woman forwarding a proposal of a to b. Notice that b cannot bounce the proposal after b
receives it because, otherwise, b′ could bounce it by the transitivity of indifference. Observe also that b may
forward a proposal from a only if she holds another proposal from him. Then it follows from the forward
step that no woman can forward a proposal of a to b as long as b holds a proposal from him. If b rejects the
proposal, then she is added to the rejection history of a, and so b does not receive any proposal from a unless
the promotion status of a changes. Hence at most 3|A||B| proposals are forwarded during the first stage.
Finally, we demonstrate that proposals are rejected only polynomially many times. For every a ∈ A,
promotion status of a, and b ∈ B such that (a, b) ∈ E, b may reject at most L proposals from a. Indeed,
b holds at most L proposals at any point in time, and since b is added to the rejection history of a after
she rejected him, b does not receive any proposal from a unless the promotion status of a changes. Hence at
most 3L|A||B| proposals are rejected during the first stage.
3 Tight Analysis
Recall that OPT is a maximum-cardinality stable matching in G, and let M be the output matching defined
above. If a ∈ A is matched with b ∈ B in OPT, we write OPT(a) := b and OPT(b) := a. Similarly, we use
the notations M(a) := b and M(b) := a when a ∈ A is matched with b ∈ B in M . Note that our analysis is
based on graph G′ and therefore all graph-related objects will assume G′.
Definition 1. A man a ∈ A is called successful if the algorithm terminates with all of his L proposals being
accepted. Likewise, a woman b is called successful if she holds L proposals when the algorithm stops. In other
words, a person c ∈ A ∪B is successful if the degree of c in G′ is L, and unsuccessful otherwise.
Definition 2. A woman is called popular if she rejected a proposal during the algorithm, and unpopular
otherwise.
Remarks 1 and 2 below directly follow from the algorithm and are consequences of the bouncing step,
and the rejection step, respectively.
Remark 1. Let a ∈ A and b, b′ ∈ B be such that b holds a proposal from a when the algorithm finishes, b′ is
unsuccessful, and b′ ≃a b. Then b is unpopular.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that b is popular. Then at some point she could not bounce or forward
any one of her proposals and so she was to reject a proposal. This implies that after b became popular,
whenever she received a new proposal that could be bounced, that proposal would immediately be bounced.
But then, when the algorithm terminates, b holds a proposal from a, that could successfully be bounced
to b′, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Remark 2. Let a, a′ ∈ A and b ∈ B be such that b holds at least two proposals from a when the algorithm
finishes, b rejected a proposal from a′ at some point, a is basic, and a′ ≃b a. Then there is an edge (a
′, b)
in G′.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that (a′, b) /∈ G′ holds. Let t be the most recent point in time when b
rejects a proposal from a′. Then it follows from the algorithm that, at t, a′′ ≥b a
′ holds for all a′′ ∈ A(b).
The rejection step also implies that, at t, there is no a′′ ∈ A such that a′ ≃b a
′′, a′′ is basic, and b holds
more than one proposal from a′′. Moreover, the algorithm implies that, after t, whenever she receives a new
proposal from a man a′′ such that a′′ <b a
′, she will immediately reject it unless she successfully bounces
or forwards it. Now, consider a point in time after t when there is a man a′′ such that a′ ≃b a
′′, b already
holds a proposal from a′′, and receives another proposal from a′′. Then the rejection step implies that she
will reject one of the proposals from a′′ unless she successfully bounces or forwards it. But then, when the
algorithm terminates, b holds at least two proposals from a, a contradiction.
3.1 Analytical techniques
In the following sections we define inputs, outputs, and costs, that are used in our charging scheme, and so
are central to our analysis. Before we take a closer look at these notions and define them formally, let us
discuss phenomena captured by them.
We use two different objects, inputs and outputs, to differentiate between two different viewpoints on
proposals accepted when the algorithm ends. In particular, inputs are associated with the viewpoint of
women on the proposals whereas outputs are associated with the viewpoint of men. The choice of terms
“inputs” and “outputs” is due to the analysis in [6] where the edges of G′ are directed from men to women,
and so each proposal becomes an “input” for the woman, and analogously becomes an “output” for the
corresponding man.
Now we describe the ideas that motivated our definitions concerning outputs and inputs. Let M + OPT
denote the multiset that contains the edges in M and the edges in OPT. To establish the approximation
guarantee of our algorithm, we analyze each connected component in M + OPT. In order to show that
M -augmenting paths in M +OPT do not lead to a large approximation guarantee, we introduce the notions
of bad and good inputs as well as bad and good outputs. For example, a certain number of bad inputs and
bad outputs are generated by the edges incident to the endpoints of an M -augmenting path in M + OPT.
Indeed, as we will see later, if a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk is an M -augmenting path in M + OPT of length
2k + 1, k ≥ 2 where a0 ∈ A, then b0 has at least L − 2 bad inputs and ak has at least L − 2 bad outputs.
Then to show the approximation guarantee of (3L− 2)/(2L− 1), we provide a way to obtain a lower bound
on the number of bad inputs and bad outputs of men and women in each M -augmenting path; and later we
provide an upper bound on the total number of bad inputs and bad outputs of all men and women.
To implement the above ideas, we use a charging scheme. Our charging scheme associates a cost with
each man and each woman. These costs keep track of bad inputs and bad outputs: bad inputs lead to an
increase of the corresponding woman’s cost and bad outputs lead to an increase of the corresponding man’s
cost. We show that the total cost of all men and women is bounded above by 2L|M |. On the other side, we
provide a lower bound on the total cost by giving a lower bound on the cost of each connected component in
M +OPT. These upper and lower bounds lead to the desired approximation guarantee of (3L− 2)/(2L− 1).
3.2 Inputs and outputs
In our analysis inputs and outputs are fundamental edge-related objects for our charging scheme. Each edge
in G′ generates a certain number of charges. For example, as we will see in Section 3.3, if an edge (a, b) in
G′ belongs either to M or to OPT, two charges are generated by (a, b) so that one is carried to node a and
one is carried to node b by cost function. To define similar charging mechanisms for the remaining types of
edges in G′, we first distinguish them as in the following definitions.
Definition 3. Given an edge (a, b) in G′, we say that (a, b) is an output from a ∈ A and an input to b ∈ B
if (a, b) is not in M + OPT.
To illustrate how outputs and inputs are determined, for example, let (a, b) ∈M , a ∈ A, b ∈ B and n(a,b)
be the number of edges of the form (a, b) in the multigraph G′, then the edge (a, b) gives rise to the following
number s(a,b) of inputs (and to the same number of outputs)
s(a,b) :=


n(a,b) − 1 if (a, b) 6∈ OPT
0 if n(a,b) = 1
n(a,b) − 2 otherwise .
Definition 4. An input (a, b) to b ∈ B is called a bad input if one of the following is true:
– b is popular and a >b OPT(b).
– b is popular, a ≃b OPT(b), but OPT(b) is unsuccessful.
– b is popular, a is 1-promoted, OPT(b) is successful and M(b) ≃b OPT(b) ≃b a.
An input (a, b) to b ∈ B is a good input if it is not a bad input. In other words, an input (a, b) to b ∈ B
is a good input if one of the following is true:
– b is unpopular.
– b is popular and OPT(b) >b a.
– b is popular, a ≃b OPT(b), OPT(b) is successful and a is not 1-promoted.
– b is popular, a ≃b OPT(b), OPT(b) is successful, but not M(b) ≃b OPT(b) ≃b a.
An output (a, b) from a man a is called a bad output if one of the following is true:
– b is unpopular.
– b is popular, b >a OPT(a), a is 1-promoted, but not M(b) ≃b OPT(b) ≃b a.
– b is popular, b >a OPT(a) and a is basic.
An output from a man a is a good output if that is not a bad output. In other words, an output (a, b)
from a man a ∈ A is a good output if one of the following is true:
– b is popular, OPT(a) ≥a b.
– b is popular, b >a OPT(a) and a is 2-promoted.
– b is popular, b >a OPT(a), a is 1-promoted and M(b) ≃b OPT(b) ≃b a.
Lemma 3. There is no edge which is both a bad input and a bad output.
Proof. Assume that an edge (a, b), a ∈ A, b ∈ B is both a bad input to b and a bad output from a. First,
consider the first case from the definition of a bad output. It trivially contradicts all the cases from the
definition of a bad input. Second, consider the first case from the definition of a bad input and either the
second or the third case from the definition of a bad output. Then the case (1) below is implied. Third,
consider the second case from the definition of a bad input and either the second or the third case from
the definition of a bad output. Then the case (2) below is implied. Finally, consider the third case from the
definition of a bad input. It trivially contradicts both the second and the third case from the definition of a
bad output. Thus one of the following cases is true:
1. a >b OPT(b); b >a OPT(a).
2. a ≃b OPT(b), and OPT(b) is unsuccessful; a is not 2-promoted.
In case (1), the edge (a, b) is a blocking pair for OPT, contradicting the stability of OPT.
In case (2), since OPT(b) is unsuccessful, OPT(b) was rejected by b as a 2-promoted man. On the other
hand, a ≃b OPT(b), a is not 2-promoted, and b holds a proposal from a when the algorithm terminates,
contradicting the rejection step. ⊓⊔
Corollary 1. The number of good inputs is at least the number of bad outputs.
Proof. Assume for a contradiction that the number of good inputs is smaller than the number of bad outputs.
Then there is an edge in G′ which is a bad output but not a good input. In other words, there is an edge in
G′ which is both a bad output and a bad input, contradicting Lemma 3. ⊓⊔
3.3 Cost
In our charging scheme, cost is a function that assigns charges, that originate from the edges, to the nodes.
More specifically, the cost of a man a is obtained by counting the edges in G′ incident to a, where bad outputs
contribute 2 and all other edges contribute 1. Similarly, the cost of a woman b is obtained by counting the
edges in G′ incident to b, to which good inputs contribute 0 and all other edges contribute 1.
In the following, let deg(u) be the degree of the node u in G′. For a ∈ A, we define his cost as follows:
cost(a) := deg(a) + k , where k is the number of bad outputs from a;
for b ∈ B, we define her cost as follows:
cost(b) := deg(b)− k , where k is the number of good inputs to b,
For a node set S ⊆ A ∪B, cost(S) is defined as the sum of costs of all the nodes in S.
The above definitions lead to next three remarks.
Remark 3. Let b ∈ B be matched in M and have at least k bad inputs. Then cost(b) ≥ k + 1.
Proof. Let k′ be the number of good inputs to b. Since b is matched in M , the edge (M(b), b) is contained
in G′ and therefore it is not an input to b. Thus deg(b) ≥ k + k′ + 1. Hence, by definition of cost, cost(b) =
deg(b)− k′ ≥ k + 1 holds. ⊓⊔
Remark 4. Let b ∈ B be matched in OPT, have at least k bad inputs, and (OPT(b), b) ∈ E′ where E′ is the
edge set of G′. Then cost(b) ≥ k + 1.
Proof. Let k′ be the number of good inputs to b. Since the edge (OPT(b), b) is in G′, it is not an input to b.
Thus deg(b) ≥ k + k′ + 1. So, by definition of cost, cost(b) = deg(b)− k′ ≥ k + 1 holds. ⊓⊔
Remark 5. Let b ∈ B be matched in both OPT and M , OPT(b) 6= M(b), and (OPT(b), b) ∈ E′ where E′ is
the edge set of G′. Then cost(b) ≥ 2.
Proof. Let k and k′ be the numbers of bad inputs and good inputs to b, respectively. Since the edges
(OPT(b), b) and (M(b), b) are contained in G′, they are not inputs to b. Thus deg(b) ≥ k + k′ + 2. So, by
definition of cost, cost(b) = deg(b)− k′ ≥ k + 2 ≥ 2 holds. ⊓⊔
3.4 The approximation ratio
Let C(M + OPT) denote the set of connected components in a graph induced by the edge set M + OPT.
Lemma 4 below bounds the cost of M + OPT and is proven in Section 3.5.
Lemma 4.
∑
C∈C(M+OPT) cost(C) ≥ (L+ 1)|OPT|+ (L− 2)(|OPT| − |M |).
We are ready to prove our main theorem, and restate it here for completeness.
Theorem 1. Given an instance of the maximum-cardinality stable matching problem with incomplete prefer-
ences, and ties of size at most L; the polynomial-time algorithm described in Section 2 finds a stable matching
M with
|M | ≥
2L− 1
3L− 2
|OPT|,
where OPT is an optimal stable matching.
Proof. By Lemma 1, we have
|M | ≥
|E′|
L
=
∑
u∈A∪B
deg(u)
2L
.
By definition of cost and by Corollary 1, we obtain
∑
u∈A∪B
deg(u) ≥ cost(A ∪B) .
Combining the above inequalities, we get
2L|M | ≥
∑
u∈A∪B
deg(u) ≥ cost(A ∪B) =
∑
C∈C(M+OPT)
cost(C) ,
By Lemma 4, we obtain
2L|M | ≥
∑
C∈C(M+OPT)
cost(C) ≥ (L+ 1)|OPT|+ (L − 2)(|OPT| − |M |) .
By rearranging the terms, we obtain
2L|M |+ (L − 2)|M | ≥ (L+ 1)|OPT|+ (L− 2)|OPT| ,
and so we obtain the desired inequality
(3L− 2)|M | ≥ (2L− 1)|OPT| .
⊓⊔
3.5 Costs of connected components in M + OPT
The purpose of this subsection is to prove Lemma 4. We call a connected component ofM +OPT trivial if it
is an isolated node. A component in M +OPT is called alternating path if the sequence of its edges alternate
being contained in M and in OPT. An alternating path is called alternating cycle if its endpoints are the
same. We call an alternating path OPT-augmenting if the edges incident to its endpoints are in M . Likewise,
we call an alternating path M -augmenting if the edges incident to its endpoints are in OPT. For ease of
exposition, henceforth, we will refer by alternating paths only to the components that are not alternating
cycles, OPT-augmenting or M -augmenting paths.
We begin by studying costs of connected components in M + OPT. For each connected component, we
find an appropriate lower bound. The costs of components that are alternating paths, alternating cycles or
OPT-augmenting paths, can be bounded from below by L + 1 multiplied by the number of edges that are
both in OPT and in the associated component. However, the costs of M -augmenting paths can be bounded
from below in a stronger way. While the costs for trivial paths, alternating paths, alternating cycles or OPT-
augmenting paths can be obtained in a straightforward way, those for M -augmenting paths are central to
our analysis and require a detailed study. After we establish the lower bounds on the costs of all connected
components in M + OPT, we start proving Lemma 4.
The following lemma bounds costs of edges in OPT from below. Recall that deg(u) is the degree of the
node u in G′.
Lemma 5. Let a ∈ A and b ∈ B be such that (a, b) ∈ OPT. Then cost({a, b}) ≥ L holds. Furthermore, if
deg(a) ≥ 1, then cost({a, b}) ≥ L+ 1; if deg(b) ≤ L− 1, then cost({a, b}) ≥ 2L− 1.
Proof. We consider deg(a) and deg(b) simultaneously. Since both are integers between 0 and L, the following
cover all possible cases for values of deg(a) and deg(b):
1. deg(a) = 0 and deg(b) = L.
2. 1 ≤ deg(a) ≤ L− 1 and deg(b) = L.
3. deg(a) = L and deg(b) = L.
4. deg(a) = L and deg(b) ≤ L− 1.
5. deg(a) ≤ L− 1 and deg(b) ≤ L− 1.
In cases (1) and (2), a is unsuccessful. Since (a, b) is an edge in G, b rejected a proposal from a, and
so b is popular. Thus there are L separate edges (a1, b), (a2, b), . . . (aL, b) in G′ such that a ≤b a
i for all
i = 1, 2, . . . , L. Moreover, none of the edges (a1, b), (a2, b), . . . , (aL, b) is a good input because b is popular,
OPT(b) ≤b a
i for all i = 1, 2, . . . , L, and OPT(b) is unsuccessful. Thus cost(b) = L.
Hence, for case (1),
cost({a, b}) ≥ cost(b) = L ;
for case (2)
cost({a, b}) = cost(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥deg(a)≥1
+ cost(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=L
≥ L+ 1 ,
as required.
In case (3), b is matched in M since deg(b) = L. Thus, by Remark 3, cost(b) ≥ 1 holds. Hence
cost({a, b}) = cost(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥deg(a)=L
+ cost(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
≥ L+ 1 ,
as desired.
In case (4), b is unsuccessful, and so b did not reject any proposal from a. Thus, a is basic and for every
edge (a, b′) ∈ G′ with b′ ∈ B, and so b′ ≥a b. Thus, by Remark 1 and Definition 4, each edge (a, b
′) ∈ G′
with b′ ∈ B is a bad output from a.
Since deg(a) = L, a is matched in M . Thus if there is no edge (a, b) in G′, then a has L− 1 bad outputs
implying the desired inequality
cost({a, b}) ≥ cost(a) = deg(a) + L− 1 = 2L− 1 .
But if there is an edge (a, b) in G′, then a has L− 2 bad outputs. Also cost(b) ≥ 1 by Remark 4. Thus
cost({a, b}) = cost(a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥2L−2
+ cost(b)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
≥ 2L− 2 + 1 = 2L− 1 ,
as needed.
In case (5), both a and b are unsuccessful. Since (a, b) is an edge in G and a is unsuccessful, a proposal
from a was rejected by b at some time during the algorithm. On the other hand, since b is unsuccessful, she
did not reject any proposal during the algorithm, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
For completeness, we state the following remark that is trivially true.
Remark 6. Trivial components have cost at least (L+ 1)|OPT ∩ C|.
Alternating paths, alternating cycles and OPT-augmenting paths Recall that despite the original
definition of alternating paths, we merely mean by them the components that are not alternating cycles,
OPT-augmenting orM -augmenting paths. The following corollary of Lemma 5 provides lower bounds on the
costs of alternating paths, alternating cycles and OPT-augmenting paths.
Corollary 2. Let C be a connected component of M + OPT such that it is an alternating path, alternating
cycle, or OPT-augmenting path. Then cost(C) ≥ (L + 1)|OPT ∩C|.
Proof. First, we note that since the length of an alternating path is even, the endpoints of it are either both
men or both women as in (3) and (4) below. In contrast, the length of an OPT-augmenting path is odd, and
so its endpoints are a man and a woman as in (1) below. Last, alternating cycles have the general form as
in (2) below, but it can be represented by various ways simply by shifting the nodes to the right or to the
left. Assuming C is as stated above, one of the following is true:
1. C is an OPT-augmenting path of the form a0 − b1 − . . .− ak − bk+1.
2. C is an alternating cycle of the form a1 − b1 − . . .− ak − bk − a1, where (a1, b1) ∈ OPT.
3. C is an alternating path of the form b1 − a1 − . . .− bk − ak − bk+1, where a1 ∈ A and (a1, b1) ∈ OPT.
4. C is an alternating path of the form a1 − b1 − . . .− ak − bk − ak+1, where a1 ∈ A and (a1, b1) ∈ OPT.
For cases (1), (2) and (3), Lemma 5 implies that cost({ai, bi}) ≥ L+ 1 for every i = 1, . . . , k. Thus
cost(C) ≥
k∑
i=1
cost({ai, bi})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L+1
≥ (L + 1)k = (L+ 1)|OPT ∩ C| ,
as required.
For case (4), Lemma 5 implies that cost({ai, bi}) ≥ L + 1 for every i = 2, . . . , k and cost({a1, b1}) ≥ L.
Since ak+1 is matched in M , cost(ak+1) ≥ 1 holds. Thus
cost(C) ≥ cost({a1, b1})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L
+ cost(ak+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥1
+
k∑
i=2
cost({ai, bi})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L+1
≥ (L+ 1)k = (L + 1)|OPT ∩C| .
⊓⊔
M-augmenting paths In this section, we provide a lower bound on the cost of components in M +OPT,
that are M -augmenting paths of length at least 5. We call an edge in an M -augmenting path terminal if
it is incident to either endpoint of the path, and internal otherwise. We start by showing that there are no
M -augmenting paths in M + OPT of length 1 or 3.
Lemma 6. There is no M -augmenting path in M + OPT, that is of length 1 or of length 3.
Proof. First, suppose that there is an M -augmenting path in M + OPT, that is of length 1. That is to say,
there exists an edge (a, b) in OPT such that neither a nor b is matched in M . Since (a, b) is in G and none
of a and b is matched in M , (a, b) is a blocking pair for M , that contradicts Lemma 2.
Second, suppose that there is an M -augmenting path in M + OPT, that is of length 3 and of form
a0− b0−a1− b1 where a0 ∈ A. Since a0 and b1 are unmatched in M , deg(a0) < L and deg(b1) < L hold, and
hence both a0 and b1 are unsuccessful. Since a0 is unsuccessful, he is 2-promoted and was rejected by every
woman in his preference list as a 2-promoted man. Since b0 is such a woman, she is popular. Also, we notice
that (a1, b0) is in M , and hence b0 holds a proposal from a1 when the algorithm terminates. Thus a1 ≥b0 a0.
Observe that (a1, b1) is in OPT, and hence (a1, b1) is in G. Since b1 is unsuccessful, b1 did not reject any
proposal during the algorithm. Since no proposal from a1 was rejected by b1, he is basic. Also, b0 ≥a1 b1
holds since b0 holds a proposal from a1 when the algorithm finishes and no proposal from a1 was rejected
by b1. Thus a1 ≥b0 a0, b0 ≥a1 b1, a0 is 2-promoted, b0 is popular, a1 is basic and b1 is unsuccessful.
First, a1 ≃b0 a0 cannot hold because a1 is basic, and b0 rejected a0 as a 2-promoted man, whereas b0 holds
a proposal from a1 when the algorithm ends. Second, b0 ≃a1 b1 cannot hold, otherwise we get a contradiction
to Remark 1 since b0 is popular, b1 is unsuccessful, and b0 holds a proposal from a1 when the algorithm
terminates. Hence we conclude that a1 >b0 a0 and b0 >a1 b1 hold. Since (a0, b0) ∈ OPT and (a1, b1) ∈ OPT,
(a1, b0) is a blocking pair for OPT, contradicting the stability of OPT. ⊓⊔
Now, we consider M -augmenting paths in M + OPT, that are of lengths at least 5. Since the length of
an M -augmenting path is odd, its endpoints are a man and a woman. Note that, our next results assume
the representation, where, without loss of generality, the leftmost node is a man. In the following definition,
a woman in an M -augmenting path points right is the compact way to say that the woman weakly prefers
the man on her right to the man on her left, where the weakly preferred man is promoted if she is indifferent
between them.
Definition 5. Let a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk be an M -augmenting path of length at least 5, where a0 ∈ A.
For i = 0, . . . , k − 1, we say that bi points right if one of the following is true:
– ai+1 >bi ai.
– ai+1 ≃bi ai, and ai+1 is not basic.
The desired lower bound on the cost ofM -augmenting paths inM+OPT is demonstrated by partitioning
an M -augmenting path into the pieces of the first terminal edge, internal edges, and the last terminal edge,
and providing a lower bound on the cost of each piece.
Remarks 7 and 8 below provide bounds on the costs of the terminal edges of an M -augmenting path in
M + OPT.
Remark 7. Let a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk be an M -augmenting path in M +OPT of length 2k + 1, k ≥ 2,
where a0 ∈ A. Then cost({a0, b0}) ≥ L. Moreover, b0 rejected a proposal from a0 at some point, and b0
points right.
Proof. First, since (a0, b0) ∈ OPT, Lemma 5 implies cost({a0, b0}) ≥ L. Second, observe that a0 is not
matched in M , and hence a0 is unsuccessful. Thus b0 rejected a0 as a 2-promoted man. On the other hand,
since b0 has a proposal from a1 when the algorithm finishes, we deduce that a1 ≥b0 a0 holds. Notice that if
a1 ≃b0 a0 holds, then a1 is not basic. Thus b0 points right, that finishes the proof. ⊓⊔
Remark 8. Let a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk be an M -augmenting path in M +OPT of length 2k + 1, k ≥ 2,
where a0 ∈ A. Then cost({ak, bk}) ≥ 2L− 1.
Proof. Observe that bk is not matched in M , and hence deg(bk) ≤ L − 1 holds. Since (ak, bk) ∈ OPT and
deg(bk) ≤ L− 1, Lemma 5 implies the desired inequality that cost({ak, bk}) ≥ 2L− 1. ⊓⊔
Lemma 7 below is important for a better understanding of the internal edges inM -augmenting paths and
can be considered as rather a technical result followed by a corollary that is of an essential use. The proof
of Lemma 7 is presented after we establish the key result of this section in Lemma 9 and prove Lemma 4.
Lemma 7. Let a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk be an M -augmenting path in M +OPT of length 2k+ 1, k ≥ 2,
where a0 ∈ A. Then for every i = 1, . . . , k − 1, at least one of the following is true:
1. cost({ai, bi}) ≥ L+ 2.
2. bi rejected a proposal from ai at some point, and bi points right.
3. ai is basic and bi−1 >ai bi.
For an M -augmenting path in M + OPT of length 2k + 1, k ≥ 2, Lemma 5 implies that each internal
edge that is both in the same path and in OPT has cost at least L+ 1. The following corollary of Lemma 7
establishes an essential fact when the cost of such an internal edge is exactly L+ 1.
Corollary 3. Let a0− b0−a1− . . .−ak− bk be an M -augmenting path in M +OPT of length 2k+1, k ≥ 2,
where a0 ∈ A. For every i = 1, . . . , k−1 such that cost({ai, bi}) = L+1, if bi−1 rejected a proposal from ai−1
at some point and bi−1 points right, then bi rejected a proposal from ai at some point and bi points right.
Proof. By Lemma 7, for every i = 1, . . . , k − 1, at least one of the following is true:
1. cost({ai, bi}) ≥ L+ 2.
2. bi rejected a proposal from ai at some point, and bi points right.
3. ai is basic and bi−1 >ai bi.
In case (1), that is an immediate contradiction to cost({ai, bi}) = L+ 1.
In case (3), ai is basic. Thus if bi−1 points right as stated, then ai−1 <bi−1 ai. Hence ai−1 <bi−1 ai and
bi−1 >ai bi, showing that (ai, bi−1) is a blocking pair for OPT, a contradiction to the stability of OPT.
In case (2), we obtain the desired statement. ⊓⊔
Lemma 8 below provides a bound on the cost of the rightmost internal edge of an M -augmenting path in
M +OPT given the fact that is established by Corollary 3 occurs. The proof of Lemma 8 is presented after
the proof of Lemma 7.
Lemma 8. Let a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk be an M -augmenting path in M +OPT of length 2k+ 1, k ≥ 2,
where a0 ∈ A. If bk−1 rejected a proposal from ak−1, and bk−1 points right, then cost({ak−1, bk−1}) ≥ L+2.
Now, we have all the tools to bound the cost of M -augmenting paths of length at least 5.
Lemma 9. Let C be a connected component of M+OPT, that is an M -augmenting path of length at least 5.
Then cost(C) ≥ (L+ 1)|OPT ∩ C|+ (L− 2).
Proof. Let C be an M -augmenting path in M + OPT of length 2k + 1, k ≥ 2. Recall our assumption that,
without loss of generality, C is of the form a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk, where a0 ∈ A. Then
cost(C) = cost({a0, b0})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L by Remark 7
+
k−1∑
i=1
cost({ai, bi})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L+1 by Lemma 5
+ cost({ak, bk})︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥2L−1 by Remark 8
≥
L+ (L + 1)(k − 1) + 2L− 1 =
(L + 1)(k − 1) + 2(L+ 1) + (L − 3) =
(L + 1)(k + 1) + (L − 3) =
(L + 1)|OPT ∩C|+ (L− 3).
By Remark 7, b0 rejected a proposal from a0 at some point, and b0 points right. Suppose now that the
above inequality is tight only. Then Corollary 3 implies that, for all i = 0, . . . , k − 1, bi rejected a proposal
from ai, and bi points right. But then, Lemma 8 implies that cost({ak−1, bk−1}) ≥ L+2 holds, contradicting
that the above inequality is tight. Thus we get the desired inequality cost(C) ≥ (L+1)|OPT∩C|+(L−2). ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 4. By Corollary 2 and Remark 6, for every connected component C in M +OPT that is not
anM -augmenting path, cost(C) ≥ (L+1)|OPT∩C| holds. Also, by Lemma 9, for each connected component
C inM+OPT that is anM -augmenting path of length at least 5, cost(C) ≥ (L+1)|OPT∩C|+(L−2) holds.
Since there are at least |OPT| − |M | M -augmenting paths in M + OPT, we obtain the desired inequality∑
C∈C(M+OPT) cost(C) ≥ (L + 1)|OPT|+ (L− 2)(|OPT| − |M |). ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 7. Clearly, (ai, bi−1) and (ai+1, bi) are contained in G
′ since they are inM . Thus deg(ai) ≥ 1
and deg(bi) ≥ 1. Moreover, since (ai, bi) is included in G, at least one of the following is true: deg(ai) = L;
and deg(bi) = L. Hence it is sufficient to consider the following cases:
I. deg(ai) < L and deg(bi) = L.
II. deg(ai) = L.
II.I. bi rejected a proposal from ai.
II.I.I. bi has at most L− 2 good inputs.
II.I.II. bi has L− 1 good inputs.
II.II. bi did not reject any proposal from ai.
II.II.I. there is an edge (ai, bi) in G
′.
II.II.II. there is not an edge (ai, bi) in G
′.
II.II.II.I. ai has at least one bad output.
II.II.II.II. ai has L− 1 good outputs.
In case (I.), ai is unsuccessful. Thus bi rejected a proposal from ai as a 2-promoted man. Also, bi has a
proposal from ai+1 when the algorithm finishes, implying (2).
In case (II.I.I.), deg(bi) = L holds since bi rejected a proposal from ai at some point during the algorithm.
Since bi has at most L− 2 good inputs, cost(bi) ≥ deg(bi)− (L− 2) = 2 holds. Thus
cost({ai, bi}) = cost(ai)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥deg(ai)=L
+ cost(bi)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥2
≥ L+ 2 ,
implying (1).
In case (II.I.II.), bi is popular since she rejected a proposal at some point. Let (a
j , bi) for all j = 1, . . . , L−1
be good inputs to bi. Then, by definition of good inputs, ai ≥bi a
j for all j = 1, . . . , L − 1. Also, aj 6= ai
for all j = 1, . . . , L − 1 because (ai, bi) ∈ OPT, (ai+1, bi) ∈ M and (a
j , bi) for all j = 1, . . . , L − 1 are good
inputs. Since bi rejected a proposal from ai at some point while she has proposals from ai+1 and a
j for
j = 1, . . . , L− 1 when the algorithm ends, we deduce that ai ≤bi ai+1 and ai ≤bi a
j for all j = 1, . . . , L− 1.
Since ai ≥bi a
j and ai ≤bi a
j , we conclude that ai ≃bi a
j for all j = 1, . . . , L− 1.
Since ai ≤bi ai+1, ai ≃bi a
j , aj 6= ai for all j = 1, . . . , L − 1, and ties are of size at most L, at least one
of the following is true:
i. ai <bi ai+1.
ii. ai ≃bi ai+1.
ii.i. there exist j′, j′′ = 1, . . . , L− 1, j′ 6= j′′ such that aj
′
= aj
′′
.
ii.ii. there exists j′ = 1, . . . , L− 1 such that aj
′
= ai+1.
In case (i.), we immediately get (2).
In case (ii.i.), by definition of good inputs, aj
′
is either basic or 2-promoted. If aj
′
is basic, that is in
contradiction to the rejection step since ai ≃bi a
j′ , bi rejected a proposal from ai at some point, bi holds no
proposal from ai while she holds two proposals from a
j′ when the algorithm terminates. If aj
′
is 2-promoted,
then ai+1 is not basic because ai+1 ≃bi a
j′ , bi rejected a
j′ as a 1-promoted man while she holds a proposal
from ai+1 when the algorithm ends. Thus we conclude (2).
In case (ii.ii.), if ai+1 is basic, that is in contradiction to the rejection step because ai ≃bi ai+1, bi rejected
a proposal from ai at some point, bi holds no proposal from ai while she holds two proposals from ai+1 when
the algorithm finishes. Thus ai+1 cannot be basic, implying that bi points right. Hence we deduce (2).
In case (II.II.I.), cost(ai) ≥ L holds. Also, by Remark 5, cost(bi) ≥ 2 holds since (ai, bi) ∈ OPT,
(ai, bi) ∈ G
′, and (ai+1, bi) ∈M . Thus cost({ai, bi}) = cost(ai) + cost(bi) ≥ L+ 2, implying (1).
In case (II.II.II.I.), since (ai+1, bi) ∈M , cost(bi) ≥ 1 holds. Also, because ai has at least one bad output,
cost(ai) ≥ deg(ai) + 1 = L+ 1 holds. Thus cost({ai, bi}) = cost(ai) + cost(bi) ≥ L+ 2, implying (1).
In case (II.II.II.II.), let (ai, b
j) for j = 1, . . . , L− 1 be good outputs from ai. Since bi did not reject any
proposal from ai during the algorithm, (ai, bi−1) ∈ M , and (ai, b
j) for j = 1, . . . , L − 1 are outputs, we
deduce that ai is basic, bi ≤ai bi−1, bi ≤ai b
j for all j = 1, . . . , L − 1. Since ai is basic and (ai, b
j) for all
j = 1, . . . , L− 1 are good outputs from ai, we deduce that, by definition of good outputs, bi 6= b
j , bi ≥ai b
j
for all j = 1, . . . , L− 1, and hence bi ≃ai b
j for all j = 1, . . . , L− 1.
Because bi ≤ai bi−1, bi ≃ai b
j , bi 6= b
j for all j = 1, . . . , L− 1, and ties are of size at most L, at least one
of the following is true:
i. bi <ai bi−1.
ii. bi ≃ai bi−1.
ii.i. there exist j′, j′′ = 1, . . . , L− 1, j′ 6= j′′ such that bj
′
= bj
′′
.
ii.ii. there exists j′ = 1, . . . , L− 1 such that bj
′
= bi−1.
In case (i.), we immediately get (3).
In cases (ii.i.) and (ii.ii.), by definition of good outputs, bj
′
is popular and so she rejected a proposal
at some point. On the other hand, bi ≃ai b
j′ , bj
′
holds at least two proposals from ai when the algorithm
finishes, bi did not reject ai during the algorithm, and bi does not hold any proposal from ai when the
algorithm terminates, a contradiction to the forward step for bj
′
. ⊓⊔
The following remark is used to simplify the proof of Lemma 8 below.
Remark 9. Let a0 − b0 − a1 − . . .− ak − bk be an M -augmenting path in M +OPT of length 2k + 1, k ≥ 2,
where a0 ∈ A. Then deg(ak−1) = L.
Proof. Suppose for a contradiction that deg(ak−1) < L, and so ak−1 is unsuccessful. Thus bk−1 rejected
ak−1 as a 2-promoted man, and so bk−1 is popular. Since bk is unmatched in M , deg(bk) < L holds. So bk is
unsuccessful, and thus ak is basic. Since bk−1 rejected a proposal from ak−1 at some point, and bk−1 has a
proposal from ak when the algorithm ends, we deduce that ak−1 ≤bk−1 ak.
First, if ak−1 ≃bk−1 ak holds, we deduce that ak is 2-promoted, contradicting the fact that ak is basic.
Thus ak−1 <bk−1 ak. Since bk did not reject any proposal from ak during the algorithm, and bk−1 holds a
proposal from ak when the algorithm terminates, bk−1 ≥ak bk holds. If bk−1 >ak bk holds, then (ak, bk−1) is
a blocking pair for OPT, contradicting the stability of OPT. We conclude that bk−1 ≃ak bk. But then, since
bk−1 has a proposal from ak when the algorithm finishes, bk is unsuccessful, and bk−1 ≃ak bk, Remark 1
implies that bk−1 is unpopular, a contradiction. ⊓⊔
Proof of Lemma 8. Observe that (ak, bk−1) ∈ M , and thus (ak, bk−1) ∈ G
′. Therefore, one of the following
cases is true:
I. there is at least one edge (ak−1, bk−1) in G
′.
II. there is no edge (ak−1, bk−1) in G
′.
II.I. there are at least two parallel edges (ak, bk−1) in G
′.
II.II. there are exactly L − 1 edges, (aj , bk−1) for j = 1, . . . , L − 1 in G
′, and aj 6= ak−1, a
j 6= ak for
j = 1, . . . , L− 1.
In case (I.), Remark 9 implies cost(ak−1) ≥ deg(ak−1) = L, and Remark 5 implies cost(bk−1) ≥ 2 since
(ak−1, bk−1) ∈ OPT, (ak−1, bk−1) ∈ G
′, and (ak, bk−1) ∈M . Thus,
cost({ak−1, bk−1}) = cost(ak−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L
+ cost(bk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥2
≥ L+ 2 ,
as desired.
In case (II.I.), since bk−1 rejected a proposal from ak−1 at some point, and bk−1 holds at least two
proposals from ak when the algorithm terminates, we deduce that bk−1 is popular and ak ≥bk−1 ak−1 holds.
Also, since bk is unmatched inM , deg(bk) < L holds. Thus bk is unsuccessful and ak is basic. If ak ≃bk−1 ak−1,
then Remark 2 implies that there is an edge (ak−1, bk−1) in G
′, a contradiction. Thus ak >bk−1 ak−1 holds.
We show that ak >bk−1 ak−1 leads to a contradiction. Since bk is unsuccessful and there is an edge
(ak, bk−1) in G
′, bk−1 ≥ak bk holds. If bk−1 >ak bk, then (ak, bk−1) is a blocking pair for OPT, contradicting
the stability of OPT. Thus bk−1 ≃ak bk holds. But then, since bk−1 holds a proposal from ak when the
algorithm ends, bk is unsuccessful, and bk−1 ≃ak bk, Remark 1 implies that bk−1 is unpopular, a contradiction.
In case (II.II.), since bk−1 holds proposals from ak and a
j for all j = 1, . . . , L − 1, and bk−1 rejected a
proposal from ak−1 at some point, we deduce that bk−1 is popular, ak ≥bk−1 ak−1, a
j ≥bk−1 ak−1 for all
j = 1, . . . , L− 1. Since bk is unmatched in M , deg(bk) < L holds and therefore bk is unsuccessful.
Analogously to the proof of case (II.I.), it can be shown that ak >bk−1 ak−1 leads to a contradiction.
Thus ak ≃bk−1 ak−1, and a
j ≥bk−1 ak−1 for all j = 1, . . . , L − 1 hold. Since a
j 6= ak−1, a
j 6= ak for all
j = 1, . . . , L− 1, and ties are of size at most L, at least one of the following is true:
i. there exists j′ = 1, . . . , L− 1 such that aj
′
>bk−1 ak−1.
ii. aj ≃bk−1 ak−1 for all j = 1, . . . , L− 1.
ii.i. there exist j′, j′′ = 1, . . . , L− 1, j′ 6= j′′ such that aj
′
= aj
′′
.
In case (i.), (aj
′
, bk−1) is a bad input to bk−1 by definition. Thus, by Remark 3, cost(bk−1) ≥ 2 holds.
Since cost(ak−1) ≥ deg(ak−1) = L holds by Remark 9, we obtain the desired inequality
cost({ak−1, bk−1}) = cost(ak−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L
+ cost(bk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥2
≥ L+ 2 .
In case (ii.i.), recall that there is no edge (ak−1, bk−1) in G
′. Since bk−1 rejected a proposal from ak−1
during the algorithm, aj
′
≃bk−1 ak−1, and (ak−1, bk−1) /∈ G
′, we deduce from Remark 2 that aj
′
is not basic.
If aj
′
is 1-promoted, then (aj
′
, bk−1) and (a
j′′ , bk−1) are bad inputs to bk−1 by definition. Thus, by Remark 3,
cost(bk−1) ≥ 3 holds. Since cost(ak−1) ≥ deg(ak−1) = L holds by Remark 9, we get the desired inequality
cost({ak−1, bk−1}) = cost(ak−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥L
+ cost(bk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≥3
≥ L+ 2 .
If aj
′
is 2-promoted, then bk−1 rejected a
j′ as a 1-promoted man. On the other hand, ak ≃bk−1 a
j′ , ak is
basic, and bk−1 holds a proposal from ak when the algorithm ends, a contradiction to the rejection step. ⊓⊔
The following example shows that the bound in Theorem 1 is tight.
Example 1. In Figure 1, the preference list of each individual is ordered from a most preferred person to a
least preferred one, where individuals within parentheses are tied. For example, aβ1 is indifferent between all
the women in his preference list except bβ1 , who is less preferred than the others.
It is straightforward to check that there exists a unique maximum-cardinality stable matching, namely
OPT = {(a0, b0)} ∪ {(a
j
i , b
j
i ) | i = 1, . . . , L − 1, j = α, β, γ}. We show that there exists an execution of
the algorithm which outputs the matching M = {(a0, b0)} ∪ {(a
α
i , b
γ
i ) | i = 1, . . . , L − 1} ∪ {(a
β
i , b
α
i ) | i =
1, . . . , L− 1}, leading to the ratio |OPT|/|M | = (3L− 2)/(2L− 1).
Proof. The following is an execution of the algorithm which leads either to the matching M or a matching
with the size of M .
– a0 makes one proposal to every woman in his list; the women accept.
– aαi for all i = 1, . . . , L− 1 makes one proposal to every woman in his list; the women accept.
– aβi for all i = 1, . . . , L− 1 makes one proposal to every woman except the last one in his list; the women
accept.
– aγi starts to propose b
γ
i for all i = 1, . . . , L − 1, but each time a
γ
i makes a proposal, the proposal is
rejected; aγi gives up.
⊓⊔
Fig. 1. An instance with ties of size at most L, L ≥ 2 for which the algorithm outputs a stable matching M with
|OPT|/|M | = (3L− 2)/(2L− 1)
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